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Abstract 
 
The paper presents an econometric study of the two bank ratings assigned by 
Moody's Investors Service. According to Moody’s methodology, foreign-
currency long-term deposit ratings are assigned on the basis of Bank Finan-
cial Strength Ratings (BFSR), taking into account “external bank support 
factors” (joint-default analysis, JDA). Models for the (unobserved) external 
support are presented, and we find that models based solely on public infor-
mation can approximate the ratings reasonably well. It appears that the ob-
served rating degradation can be explained by the growth of the banking sys-
tem as a whole. Moody’s has a special approach for banks in developing 
countries in general and for Russia in particular. The models help reveal the 
factors that are important for external bank support. 
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1 – Introduction 
 
The credit ratings of Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch play a 
key role in the pricing of credit risk. This role will be further expanded with 
the implementation of the Basel-2 Accord, which requires rating estimations 
of bank partners’ credit risk. 
These ratings are especially important for banks in developing coun-
tries, since economic agents there do not have long experience the market 
economy and so are not highly experienced in estimating risks. There are in 
fact few firms in these countries that have ratings by the international rating 
agencies. One of the reasons is that banks have to pay a lot to the agency for 
the rating procedure. For example, at the end of 2007, only 84 of 1135 Rus-
sian banks had Moody’s ratings (about 120 had at least one rating by an inter-
national rating agency). Since Moody’s rates more Russian banks than any 
other agency, we focus in this paper on Moody’s ratings. 
There are not enough observations on Moody’s ratings of Russian 
banks for the purpose of econometric modelling, which is why we use a large 
sample of international banks (incl. Russian banks) in order to achieve model 
identification. The idea is that we can design a model based on a large interna-
tional data set and tailor it to Russia with the relatively small data set that we 
have for Russia. 
According to Moody’s methodology [Moody’s (2007a,b)], Foreign-
currency long-term deposit ratings (DR) are assigned on the basis of Bank 
Financial Strength Ratings (BFSR), taking into account “external banks sup-
port factors” (joint-default analysis, JDA). We build models for both ratings. 
Our paper contributes to the extant literature in two ways. First, we 
build econometric models of two Moody’s bank ratings, including banks from 
developing countries (including Russia), using only publicly available infor-
mation. We demonstrate that the goodness of fit of the models which use only 
public information is fairly good. Second, we use the models to study the “rat-
ing degradation” [Blume et al. (1998); Amato and Furfine (2004)], to demon-
strate the special approach of Moody’s to developing countries and to model 
the unobserved “external bank support factors” which Moody’s experts take 
into account. 
In practice, such models could be used by banks (in implementing the 
Basel-2 IRB approach) and by bank supervision authorities (as part of an 
Early Warning System, EWS), especially in developing countries, where there 
are still many banks without ratings. 
There is a vast literature on econometric models of ratings. Altman 
and Saunders (1998) include a review of the approaches to modelling credit 
risk. The seminal paper by Altman and Rijken (2004) uses rating models to 
study the observed stability of ratings. Soest et al. (2003) were the first to 
model the ratings of Russian banks. Blume et al. (1998) use models to demon-
strate “rating degradation” and find that rating standards have become more 
stringent in terms of the specific variables used in their study. By contrast, 
Amato and Furfine (2004) argue that this finding is overturned when account 
is taken of systematic changes in risk measures. 
In 2007 Moody’s introduced a new JDA (joint-default analysis) ap-
proach for assigning the Foreign-currency long-term deposit rating (DR) on 
the basis of Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSR), taking into account “ex-
ternal bank support factors” [Moody’s, 2007a,b]. 
Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSR) represent Moody’s 
opinion of a bank’s intrinsic safety and soundness. Assigning a BFSR is the 
first step in Moody’s bank credit rating process. BFSR is a measure of the 
likelihood that a bank will require assistance from third parties such as its 
owners, its industry group, or official institutions, in order to avoid a default. 
BFSR do not take into account the probability that the bank will receive such 
external support, nor do they address the external risk that sovereign actions 
may interfere with a bank’s ability to honor its domestic or foreign currency 
obligations. DR (deposit rating) — as a view of relative credit risk — incorpo-
rates the Bank Financial Strength Rating as well as Moody’s expert opinion of 
any external support. 
We use our models to reveal which public information is helpful in 
forecasting “external bank support factors”, i.e. we build a model for such 
(unobserved) “external bank support factors”. 
 
2 – Data 
 
The dataset consists of financial indicators from the publicly available 
bank balance sheets of banks from 42 developed (DEV = 0) and developing 
(DEV = 1) countries for the period 2002–2005. Moody’s bank ratings for 
these banks are available for the period 2003–2006. Overall there are about 
1000 observations on some 380 banks. Fig. 1 presents the distribution of 
banks in the dataset which have BFSR over 4 regions. The distribution resem-
bles that for all banks, except that North American banks are not included in 
the data.  
Figure 1. Distribution of banks with BFSR over the dataset 
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The distribution of banks over BFSR rating categories is presented in 
Fig. 2. The two modes in the histogram can be explained by heterogeneous 
development of bank systems. Banks in developed countries generally have 
high ratings, the benefit of publishing low ratings being ambiguous. This con-
trasts with the situation in developing countries, where any rating by an inter-
national rating agency is a good sign. Due to country ceilings, most of banks 
from developing countries have BFSR ratings below D+. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of banks in dataset for BFSR rating categories 
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Correspondence between BFSR (E to A) and DR (B3 to Aaa) ratings 
in the world in January 2007 is presented in table 1. Each cell in the table 
gives the number of banks with the corresponding pair of ratings categories. 
Since most banks were concentrated along the diagonal, one is inclined to 
conclude that BFSR determines DR on the whole. However, some banks are 
concentrated above the diagonal, which means that some banks have DR rat-
ings higher than BFSR ratings due to external bank support factors. 
For model estimation, we use ordinal numerical scales for ratings 
from 12 to 0 for RFSR and from 15 to 0 for DR. Zero corresponds to the 
higher rating category.  
 
Table 1. Correspondence between BFSR and DR ratings in the world, 
January 2007 
  A A– B+ B B– C+ C C– D+ D D– E+ E 
Aaa 6 1  1 2  3 2 1   1  
Aa1  8 2 4 2  3 3 2 1    
Aa2   28 16 2 2 6 2 1  1   
Aa3   2 48 18 15 11 9 8     
A1     36 15 13 11 16 1 1   
A2     2 83 23 19 16 6 7   
A3      1 72 15 17 10 10 2  
Baa1      1 4 24 13 6 5 1  
Baa2        18 10 14 12 11  
Baa3         8 5 4 3 1 
Ba1         3 5 6 2  
Ba2        4 4 11 6 6  
Ba3      1 2 2 9 3 24 10 1 
B1        1 9 7 5 26 3 
B2          1 2 39 3 
B3          1 3 16  
 
The financial indicators in the dataset and their descriptive statistics 
and correlations are presented in tables 5–7 in the Appendix. Financial indica-
tors are grouped with respect to Moody’s methodology [Moody’s (2007a)]. 
The main groups are: size of the bank, capital adequacy, profitability, effi-
ciency, and asset quality (table 6). For each group, the indicators are highly 
correlated, which is why it is not reasonable to include all of them in the mod-
els. 
In addition to the bank financial indicators, the following variables are 
included in the models: 
• Dummy variables: indicators of whether the bank belongs to the develop-
ing market (DEV = 1) and RUS = 1 if the bank is from Russia (therefore for 
bnk from Russia DEV = RUS = 1).  
• Dummy variables for years D03–D05 for observations on financial indi-
cators for 2003–2005  
• Corruption perceptions index from Transparency International agency 
(2007), TI CPI  
• Volatility of the country’s economic growth; VOLAT has values from 1 
to 5; the index is calculated according to Moody’s methodology from the 
sample standard deviation of a country’s nominal GDP growth for the last 20 
years. 
 
3 - Models 
 
In this section, the two ratings (DR, BFSR) will be explained in terms 
of a small set of bank characteristics, time dummies and country-specific vari-
ables. Since a rating is a qualitative ordinal variable, the natural choice for 
ratings analysis is a model of ordered response (ordered logit). See [Kaplan 
and Urwitz (1979)] for the first application of this model to bond ratings. We 
use White-Huber standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. In selecting 
a model, the main criteria are economic interpretation and certain statistical 
criteria: Akaike criterion, pseudo-R2, and t-statistics.  
Preliminary examination of the gaps between the time of actual rating 
observation and the time of observation of bank financial indicator reveals an 
“optimal” time gap of 18 months. (6, 12, 18, 24 months gaps are considered as 
candidates). 
In table 2, two models for each of the two ratings are presented. The 
same set of regressors is selected for the two models, since in the next section 
these models are used for modelling external support. Bank financial per-
formance indicators included in the models are presented in table 6 in the Ap-
pendix. As one can see from table 7, financial indicators for the same group 
are usually highly correlated, which is why only 1 or 2 of them are included in 
the model.  
Models 1 and 2 are for DR rating. Model 1 uses the initial bank data 
and model 2 the quantile scales for bank financial indicators. To construct a 
quantile scale for the bank-specific variable x we use the share of banks in the 
sample for the given year t with values of variable x smaller than that of xit for 
the given bank i. That is, in quantile scale regressions, we use 
( |it it )x P X x year t= < =?  instead of xit. Thus, in the regression in quantile 
scales, bank-specific variables reflect the relative position of the given bank in 
the banking system in the given year with respect to the corresponding vari-
able. 
 
Table 2. Models for DR and BFSR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  DR DR BFSR BFSR 
  Natural Quantile Natural Quantile 
Year 2003 D03   0.586*** 
  (0.153) 
  0.192 
 (0.154) 
  0.571*** 
 (0.158) 
  0.005 
 (0.156) 
Year 2004 D04   0.660*** 
 (0.151) 
–0.011 
(0.145) 
  0.869*** 
 (0.162) 
–0.059 
 (0.151) 
Year 2005 D05   1.332*** 
 (0.320) 
  0.162 
 (0.319) 
  1.552*** 
 (0.321) 
  0.133 
 (0.364) 
Developing market DEV –0.078 
 (0.263) 
–0.342 
(0.277) 
  2.058*** 
 (0.350) 
  2.322*** 
 (0.312) 
Russia RUS   0.256 
 (0.232) 
  0.261 
(0.208) 
  2.827*** 
 (0.394) 
  2.176*** 
 (0.341) 
Volatility of economic 
growth 
VOLAT –0.036 
 (0.074) 
  0.059 
 (0.073) 
–0.034 
 (0.068) 
–0.014 
 (0.065) 
Corruption index TI CPI –0.588*** 
 (0.045) 
–0.647*** 
(0.046) 
–0.610***
 (0.047) 
–0.598*** 
 (0.047) 
Logarithm of total 
assets 
LTA –0.734*** 
 (0.052) 
–4.576*** 
 (0.412) 
–1.159***
 (0.067) 
–7.419*** 
 (0.418) 
Customer Deposits / 
Shareholders’ Equity 
D_EQ   0.144*** 
 (0.015) 
  3.094*** 
 (0.295) 
  0.103***
 (0.016) 
  1.419*** 
 (0.329) 
Shareholders’ Equity 
(%) Total Assets 
EQ_TA   0.088*** 
 (0.022) 
  2.980*** 
 (0.455) 
  0.031 
 (0.023) 
  0.255 
 (0.473) 
Problem Loans (%) 
Gross Loans 
PL_GL   0.012 
 (0.010) 
  0.596* 
 (0.313) 
  0.087*** 
 (0.025) 
  1.941*** 
 (0.336) 
Personnel Expenses 
(%) Operation Income
PE_OI   1.451** 
 (0.615) 
  0.019 
 (0.239) 
  4.737*** 
 (0.910) 
  1.159*** 
 (0.292) 
Interest expense (%) 
Avg interest bearing 
liabilities 
CIBL   0.386*** 
 (0.074) 
  1.753*** 
 (0.622) 
  0.407***
 (0.101) 
  2.960*** 
 (0.788) 
Interest Income (%) 
Avg Interest Earning 
Assets 
YAEA –0.035 
 (0.037) 
–0.410 
 (0.518) 
–0.119*** 
 (0.038) 
–1.657*** 
 (0.639) 
Interest Expense (%) 
Interest Income 
IE_II –0.0070 
 (0.0058) 
  1.020** 
 (0.518) 
  0.0058 
 (0.0088) 
  0.599 
 (0.590) 
Pseudo-R2  0.254 0.242 0.385 0.367 
*,**, and *** — significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Standard errors in brackets 
 
Time dummies are positive and significantly different from zero in 
models 1 and 3 in natural scales. Moreover, the coefficient of the time dummy 
increases with time (e.g. 0.586, 0.660, and 1.332 for 2003, 2004 and 2005 in 
model 1). This means that if a bank keeps its financial indicators constant over 
time it gets a lower rating in 2005 than in 2002 (rating degradation). Consis-
tent with the finding in [Karminsky and Peresetsky (2007)], the time dummies 
are insignificant in models 2 and 4 in the quantile scales. That is, if a bank 
keeps constant its relative position in the banking system, its rating does not 
change. This means that rating degradations observed in models 1 and 3 sim-
ply reflect the advancement of the banking system as whole. If a bank does 
not show “improvement” against a background of the general “improvement” 
of other banks, then its rating gets degraded. And if, for example, a bank 
grows in size at the same rate as the size of the banking system grows and the 
bank keeps its relative position in the system, its rating does not change. 
However, the goodness of fit measure pseudo-R2 is higher for models 
with natural scales (models 1 and 3) than for models with quantile scales 
(models 2 and 4), and therefore we use the models in natural variables below. 
Both ratings are higher for large banks. Ratings are lower for banks 
with high ratios of customer deposits to shareholders’ equity, since that ratio 
increases with risk. Poor quality of loans (problem loans as % of gross loans) 
also lowers the ratings. Inefficiency (high personnel expenses) lowers the rat-
ings. Capitalization (equity-to-assets ratio) is significant only for the DR 
model, which might be explained by its being related to a bank’s external 
support factors. 
Given that all the other variables are fixed, the BFSR rating is lower 
for banks in developing markets and even lower for banks in Russia1. This 
means that political and structural risks are taken into account in BFSR rat-
ings. The influence of those two factors (DEV, RUS) is less for DR; clearly, it 
is smoothed by external support, which is more pronounced in developing 
countries. This finding is in line with that of Somerville and Taffler (1995), 
who study Institutional Investor country credit ratings and frequency of ar-
rears on external debt-service, and conclude that bankers are overly pessimis-
tic about the creditworthiness of less-developed countries. 
Banks in countries with high levels of corruption have on average 
lower ratings. (Recall that a low value of TI CPI means a high level of corrup-
tion). 
Goodness of fit (pseudo-R2) is higher for models of BFSR rating 
(0.36–0.38) than for DR rating models (0.24–0.25). This is to be expected, 
since DR includes by construction more expert opinions (e.g. external sup-
                                                 
1 We have also made that study for a few other developing countries: results are presented in 
table 8 in the Appendix. 
port), and hence should be less suitable for modelling with publicly available 
data than BFSR ratings, which are stand-along ratings. 
 
4 - Models for external bank support factors 
 
According to Moody’s methodology [Moody’s (2007a,b)], a DR rat-
ing differs from a BFSR rating in terms of “external support” factors. One 
approach to determining which publicly available factors q are important for 
external support is to simply regress DR on BSFR and q. However, this pro-
cedure is made problematic by the fact that both DR and BFSR are discrete 
variables. We therefore resort to a more flexible procedure,  as described be-
low.  
An ordered logit model is formulated as 
 
*i iy x iβ ε′= + ,     (1) 
1( ) ( *i r iP ratin )rg r P c y c−= = < < . 
 
The forecast of the model “index” is ˆˆi iy x β′= , which could be considered a 
latent variable, a continuous measure for the rating. Let  and iˆz ˆiy  be esti-
mated latent variables for the DR and BFSR ratings respectively. According 
to Moody’s methodology,  contains information from iˆz ˆiy  and additional 
information on external bank support factors. Thus we can regress  on a 
function of 
iˆz
ˆiy  and additional regressors (2). Then, if the additional regressors 
 are significant, they must be related to the external bank support factors: tq
 
ˆˆ ( )i i iz f y q iγ ε′= + +     (2) 
 
Since the function is unknown, we calculate the Taylor expansion of that 
function of order k , the order being determined by the number of statistically 
significant powers of ˆiy : 
 
0 1 ˆ ˆˆ ... ( )
k
i i k i iz y y q iβ β β γ′ ε= + + + + +    (3) 
 
The results of regression (3) for 5k =  are presented in table 3 ( β s are not 
shown); two regressions are presented: (0) without any factors q, and (1) with 
a set of factors q consisting of time and country-specific dummies. One can 
see that external support is lower in 2007 (recall that the dummy is related to 
the time of data observation and the rating is assigned 18 months later) and is 
higher for developing than for developed countries. In Russia, external sup-
port is even higher than the average support in developing markets. A high R2 
for regression (0) shows that BFSR largely determines RD (see table 1).  
 
Table 3. Models for external support 
 (0) (1) 
Year 2003 —   0.111**   (0.058) 
Year 2004 — –0.021       (0.056) 
Year 2005 —   0.462***  (0.154) 
Developing market — –0.255**    (0.114) 
Russia — –0.873***  (0.105) 
R2 0.942 0.947 
R2 adjusted 0.941 0.946 
*,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
We use model (1) from table 3 as a benchmark and add additional explanatory 
variables in the functional form 21 2iq iqγ γ+ , assuming the possibility of a 
nonlinear impact of factor q. Then we test the null hypothesis of zero impact: 
0 1 2:H 0γ γ= = . Table 4 gives the results of such regressions, showing only 
the estimates for 1, 2γ γ , F-statistic and R2 . The factors are sorted in accor-
dance with volume of impact on external support.  
The last column indicates the direction of impact. Consider, for ex-
ample, the interest income-to-earning assets ratio. The functional form is ac-
tually U-shaped, but the parabola vertex is at 48.8, which is much greater than 
the sample average of 6.8. Hence the larger the value of q (earning assets ra-
tio), the larger the value of its impact 21 2q qγ γ+ and the lower the external 
support. We conclude that a high interest income-to-earning assets ratio indi-
cates a low level of external support. Similar considerations imply that the 
relationship between bank size and the corruption index is U-shaped. External 
support is low for high and low values of the corruption index. A bank with 
bad loans needs external support, as do banks in countries with high volatility 
of economic growth. 
 
 
Table 4. Models for external support 
Factor 1ˆγ  2γˆ  F-stat R2 Support 
Interest Income (%) 
 Avg Interest Earning Assets 
  0.194*** 
 (0.011) 
–0.0020*** 
 (0.0003) 
396 0.971 – 
Problem Loans (%)  
 Gross Loans 
–0.069*** 
 (0.005) 
  0.00001 
 (0.00008) 
278 0.966 + 
Corruption index –1.088*** 
 (0.069) 
  0.068*** 
 (0.005) 
180 0.961 ∩ 
Interest expense (%)  
Avg interest bearing liabilities 
  0.107*** 
 (0.018) 
  0.0028*** 
 (0.0010) 
151 0.960 – 
Personnel Expenses (%)  
Operation Income 
   0.186 
 (0.778) 
–4.66*** 
 (1.268) 
75 0.954 + 
Shareholders’ Equity (%)  
Total Assets 
  0.022* 
 (0.012) 
  0.00098***
 (0.00034) 
46.5 0.951 – 
Volatility of economic growth –0.284*** 
 (0.104) 
  0.070*** 
 (0.016) 
30.5 0.950 + 
Interest Expense (%)  
Interest Income 
–0.0003 
 (0.0051) 
–0.000067 
 (0.000043) 
17.7 0.949  
Logarithm of total assets –0.520*** 
 (0.112) 
  0.029*** 
 (0.006) 
12.9 0.948 ∩ 
Customer Deposits /  
Shareholders’ Equity 
–0.011 
 (0.015) 
  0.0013* 
 (0.0007) 
6.5 0.947  
*,**, and *** denote significance  at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels; standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
5 - Forecasting performance 
 
In this section we study the in-sample forecasting power of the four 
models for DR and BFSR ratings from table 2. It is not clear how best to fore-
cast with an ordered logit model. One approach is the following. Given the 
values of the ix  indicators, calculate ˆ'ix β  and then estimate the probabilities 
( ) ( )i ip r P rating r= =
ip r
; the forecast of the rating  is that which corresponds 
to the maximum probability:  
iˆr
ˆ arg max ( )ir =  — the ML-forecast. 
However, even for the binary logit model, this is not the best forecast-
ing method. It leads to the choice of type 1 outcome if its estimated probabil-
ity is greater than 0.5. If there is a small proportion of type 1 outcomes in the 
sample, this procedure will produce too many faulty forecasts. For this reason, 
some authors have recommended the use of another threshold (greater than 
0.5) in this case.  
Another natural forecasting procedure is to calculate ˆ'ix β  and then 
find the interval  that contains it and use 1[ ,r rc c− ] iˆr r=  as the forecast value 
(see equation (1)). We call this the interval-forecast. 
As expected from the goodness of fit measure (pseudo-R2), models 1 
and 3 have slightly better predictive power than models 2 and 4, respectively; 
hence we show the results only for models 1 and 3. 
Tables M1a and M1b present the figures for DR rating category fore-
casts for model 1 using the ML and interval-forecast methods. Cell entries are 
the numbers of forecasts. For example, 31 in column Aa3, row Aa2 means 
that 31 banks with rating Aa2 are classified as banks with rating Aa3 by the 
ML-forecast method. For the interval-forecast method, the number is 22 (table 
M1b). 
Table M1a reveals the drawbacks of the ML-forecast method: rating 
categories Aaa, Aa1, A1, Baa1, Baa3, Ba1, Ba3 are never forecasted. In terms 
of econometrics, the reason is that the probabilities for the corresponding in-
tervals 1( *r iP c )ry c− < <  are too small relative to the other intervals. There 
are several underlying factors for this. The first is the relatively small number 
of sample observations with corresponding rating categories: 13 for Aaa, 22 
for Aa1, 9 for Baa3, etc. (see table M1c). Hence, ML model estimation is 
“tuned” to other, more frequently observed, ratings. Another factor is that a 
triple-A rating is difficult to forecast because it is assigned only in exceptional 
circumstances, taking into account much informal information that is not ac-
counted for in the model. Rating categories Baa3 and Ba1 are on the border-
line between the investment and speculative rating classes. The difference 
between them is crucial for insurance companies and pension funds, which are 
allowed to invest only in firms with investment-level ratings. This is why 
there could be a psychological barrier for Moody’s experts in assigning these 
ratings. Similar reasoning could be applied to the Aa1 (on the border between 
the top rating classes, Aaa and Aa), A1 (the border of the upper investment 
rating class), and Ba3 (the border between Ba and B rating classes) ratings. 
Table M1b shows that the interval-forecast is almost free from that 
drawback. Only three rating categories (Aaa, Aa1 and Baa3) are never fore-
casted. The above explanations concerning qualitative borders between rating 
classes are also applicable here. 
Table M1c gives figures for correct ( 0Δ = ) and correct-within-one-
rating category ( | | 1Δ ≤ ) forecasts. For example, for the most common rating 
category in the sample, A2, the correct forecast percentages are 56.4% (ML-
forecast) and 44.8% (interval-forecast); the respective correct-within-one-
rating category forecast percentages are 64.9% and 84.2%. 
The correct rating category forecast percentages are roughly the same 
for the two forecasting methods (ca 32%); for the correct-within-one-rating-
category forecasts, the figures are 67-69%. 
Table M1d presents the corresponding percentages for forecasts of 
DR rating classes: 61% for correct forecasts and 96% for correct-within-one-
rating class forecasts. 
Tables M3a, M3b, M3c, M3d present the BSFR rating forecasts for 
model 3, arranged as in tables M1a, M1b, M1c, M1d. Only two ratings cate-
gories, A and B-, involve the same problem of never being forecasted by the 
ML method. The percentages for correct rating categories forecasts are about 
44%; for correct-within-one-rating category, 82%-83%. For the rating classes, 
the respective percentages are 74–75% and 99.6%. 
On the whole, one can say that the predictive power of the BFSR rat-
ing model is higher than that of the DR rating model. As mentioned above, 
this is to be expected, since BFSR, by construction, reflects the bank’s stand-
alone position and includes less qualitative, informal factors than does the DR 
rating. 
The interval-forecast method seems to outperform the ML-forecast 
method. 
 
6 - Conclusions 
 
Econometric models are constructed for two Moody’s bank ratings: 
Foreign-currency long-term deposit rating (DR) and Bank Financial Strength 
Ratings (BFSR). The models use only public information and show a good 
prediction power. Therefore, such models could be used as part of early warn-
ing systems (EWS) by bank regulators and for risk evaluation within the IRB 
framework in the Basel-2 Accord. 
The significant factors in regressions are the factors that are crucial 
for Moody’s methodology: county-specific volatility of economic growth and 
the corruption index; bank-specific size (log of total assets), capital adequacy 
(customer deposits / shareholders’ equity, shareholders’ equity / total assets); 
assets quality (problem loans / gross loans) efficiency (personnel expenses / 
operation income), and profitability (interest expense / average interest bear-
ing liabilities).  
The best prediction power is achieved by models with 12-18 months 
lag between the time of observation of factors and the time of observation of 
ratings. 
Given all the other factors, banks from developing countries get lower 
ratings and Russian banks get still lower ratings. It is quite possible that 
Moody’s takes into account political risks in these countries. 
It appears that the negative time trend disappears in models with 
quantile scales for bank-specific factors. This means that the rating agency 
actually relies not on absolute values of the bank’s financial indicators, but on 
their relative values within the whole banking system. Hence the observed 
rating degradation for models with natural scales can be explained by the 
growth of the banking system as a whole. 
A methodology for measuring external bank support factors was de-
veloped, and the most important factors for that support were found. It was 
demonstrated that banks in developing countries, and especially in Russia, 
have higher levels of external support than do banks in developing countries. 
Models for FSFR rating have a higher predictive power than DR 
models. The interval-forecast method performs better than the ML forecast 
method for the constructed ordered logit models. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
 VOLAT TI CPI LTA TA D_EQ EQ_TA 
Mean 3.07 5.82 9.414 263073 8.49 7.63 
Maximum 5.00 9.70 14.239 16334506 26.12 50.51 
Minimum 1.00 2.1 4.007 107.5 0.00 0.78 
Std.Dev. 1.35 2.36 1.930 1097524. 4.87 4.81 
 
 PL_GL PE_OI CIBL YAEA IE_II 
Mean 4.63 0.30 3.92 6.92 55.29 
Maximum 87.77 0.69 28.22 46.35 157.1 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.29 0.144 
Std.Dev. 7.21 0.10 2.56 4.36 18.3 
 
Table 6. Financial indicators (highlighted ones included in models) 
Indicator Indicator Indicator’s group 
TA Total assets ($, mln) 
LTA Logarithm of total assets 
EQ Shareholders’ Equity ($, mln) 
Size 
YAEA Interest Income (%) Average Interest Earning Assets 
CIBL Interest Expense (%) Average Interest Bearing Li-abilities 
NIM Net Interest Margin 
ROAA Return on Average Assets (%) 
ROAE Return on Average Equity (%) 
IE_II Interest Expense (%) Interest Income 
Profitability 
CIR Cost to Income Ratio (%) 
PE_OI Personnel Expenses (%) Operation Income Efficiency 
PL_GL Problem Loans (%) Gross Loans 
LLR_GL Loan Loss Reserve (%) Gross Loans 
PL_EQ_LL
R 
Problem Loans (%) Shareholders’ Equity + Loan Loss 
Reserve 
Assets 
Quality 
T1 Tier 1 ratio (%) 
EQ_TA Shareholders’ Equity (%) Total Assets 
CAR Capital Adequacy (%) 
D_EQ Customer Deposits / Shareholders’ Equity  
Capital  
adequacy 
Table 7. Correlations 
 LTA EQ YAEA CIBL NIM ROA ROE IE_II CIR 
LTA 1 0.008 –0.364 –0.186 –0.370 –0.291 0.012 0.258 0.160 
EQ 0.008 1 0.133 0.133 0.020 0.018 0.053 0.082 –0.053 
YAEA –0.364 0.133 1 0.730 0.687 0.451 0.160 –0.048 –0.165 
CIBL –0.186 0.133 0.730 1 0.240 0.120 0.013 0.496 –0.150 
NIM –0.370 0.020 0.687 0.240 1 0.763 0.162 –0.426 –0.214 
ROA –0.291 0.018 0.451 0.120 0.763 1 0.511 –0.334 –0.468 
ROE 0.012 0.053 0.160 0.013 0.162 0.511 1 –0.123 –0.341 
IE_II 0.258 0.082 –0.048 0.496 –0.426 –0.334 –0.123 1 0.060 
CIR 0.160 –0.053 –0.165 –0.150 –0.214 –0.468 –0.341 0.060 1 
PE_OI 0.296 –0.037 –0.248 –0.257 –0.153 –0.320 –0.232 –0.058 0.755 
PL_GL –0.107 0.150 0.026 –0.005 0.027 –0.083 –0.173 –0.016 0.074 
PL_EQ_LLR 0.123 0.076 0.041 0.036 –0.022 –0.228 –0.253 –0.019 0.135 
T1 –0.296 0.093 0.119 0.078 0.138 0.275 0.078 –0.050 –0.314 
EQ_TA –0.555 –0.019 0.317 0.055 0.443 0.525 0.082 –0.453 –0.287 
D_EQ 0.248 0.111 –0.101 –0.049 –0.142 –0.237 –0.098 0.093 0.270 
 
 PE_OI PL_GL PL_EQ_LLR T1 EQ_TA D_EQ 
LTA 0.296 –0.107 0.123 –0.296 –0.555 0.248 
SE –0.037 0.150 0.076 0.093 –0.019 0.111 
YAEA –0.248 0.026 0.041 0.119 0.317 –0.101
CIBL –0.257 –0.005 0.036 0.078 0.055 –0.049
NIM –0.153 0.027 –0.022 0.138 0.443 –0.142
ROA –0.320 –0.083 –0.228 0.275 0.525 –0.237
ROE –0.232 –0.173 –0.253 0.078 0.082 –0.098
IE_II –0.058 –0.016 –0.019 –0.050 –0.453 0.093 
CIR 0.755 0.074 0.135 –0.314 –0.287 0.270 
PE_OI 1 –0.063 0.131 –0.336 –0.265 0.309 
PL_GL –0.063 1 0.568 0.057 0.053 0.016 
PL_EQ_LLR 0.131 0.568 1 –0.213 –0.166 0.215 
T1 –0.336 0.057 –0.213 1 0.516 –0.310
EQ_TA –0.265 0.053 –0.166 0.516 1 –0.434
D_EQ 0.309 0.016 0.215 –0.310 –0.434 1 
 
Table 8. Regression results for BSFR models for other countries 
   (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
   separate joint  separate joint 
   natural natural  quantile quantile 
Country Obs. banks Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. 
Russia 94 45 2.848*** 
(0.395) 
4.068*** 
(0.634)  
2.178***
(0.342) 
3.144*** 
(0.445) 
Kazakhstan 35 13 0.400 
(0.429) 
2.476*** 
(0.628)  
0.062 
(0.305) 
1.911*** 
(0.466) 
Ukraine 26 13 –0.282 
(0.487) 
2.103*** 
(0.773)  
–0.031 
(0.483) 
1.876*** 
(0.660) 
Turkey 35 15 –0.843* 
(0.487) 
1.170* 
(0.698)  
–0.264 
(0.628) 
1.059 
(0.708) 
India 39 11 0.368 
(0.302) 
0.910** 
(0.382)  
0.496 
(0.330) 
0.782** 
(0.367) 
Egypt 20 6 –1.499*** 
(0.563) 
–1.490***
(0.541)  
–2.094 
(1.354) 
–1.857 
(1.263) 
Poland 20 8 0.902** 
(0.372) 
0.779** 
(0.381)  
0.755* 
(0.451) 
0.561 
(0.507) 
Hungary 22 8 –2.117*** 
(0.502) 
–1.759***
(0.605)  
–2.710***
(0.462) 
–2.061*** 
(0.497) 
 
From table 2 we conclude that Russia has lower ratings than the other 
developing countries, given the other factors. To study whether Russia is an 
exception, we ran regressions for BFSR rating, similar to models 3 and 4 from 
table 2, substituting the Russia dummy with dummies for one of the seven 
other developing countries. The results are presented at table 8. Column (1) 
shows the results for eight separate regressions in natural scales and column 
(3) those for the same eight regressions in quantile scales. Only the coeffi-
cients of country dummies and corresponding standard errors in brackets are 
shown. Columns (2) and (4) present results for the two regressions when all 
eight country dummies are included. 
One notes underestimating results for the Kazakhstan and Ukraine rat-
ings, as is the case for Russia. Coefficients for those countries are significant 
and positive, albeit lower in value than the coefficient for Russia. The same 
effect, but even less pronounced, is observed for India and Poland. Turkey 
does not differ from the other developing countries, but Egypt, and especially 
Hungary, show the opposite effect (ratings are better than average for devel-
oping countries, given the other factors). It appears that the rating agency ex-
perts estimate the political and structural risks in post-Soviet countries to be 
higher than the average risks for developing countries.  
Table M1a. DR model 1, ML forecast 
  Forecasted rating category 
 
 Aa
a 
Aa
1 
Aa
2 
Aa
3 
A1 A2 A3 Baa
1 
Baa
2 
Baa
3 
Ba
1 
Ba
2 
Ba
3 
B1 B2 B3 
Aaa 0 0 3 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aa1 0 0 13 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aa2 0 0 7 31 0 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aa3 0 0 12 62 0 36 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A1 0 0 1 40 0 45 12 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
A2 0 0 2 21 0 97 25 0 16 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 
A3 0 0 0 6 0 78 37 0 6 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Baa1 0 0 0 1 0 12 30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 16 10 0 14 0 0 17 0 2 1 0 
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 14 0 1 2 0 
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 8 0 0 48 0 5 0 0 
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 2 0 0 10 0 6 8 0 
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 16 0 17 17 2 
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 16 0 7 25 2 
A
ct
ua
l r
at
in
g 
 
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 1 2 2 
 
Table M1b. DR model 1, interval forecast 
  Forecasted rating category 
  Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 
Aaa 0 0 7 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aa1 0 0 14 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aa2 0 1 8 22 13 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aa3 0 0 18 33 45 12 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A1 0 0 1 18 41 23 13 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A2 0 0 2 7 29 77 18 11 18 0 2 8 0 0 0 0 
A3 0 0 0 3 16 52 41 7 9 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Baa1 0 0 0 1 0 10 25 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Baa2 0 0 0 0 1 12 11 1 18 2 5 7 0 3 0 0 
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 12 1 0 2 0 
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 12 2 9 34 6 0 0 0 
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 7 6 6 5 0 
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 7 8 20 12 0 
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 10 2 15 16 2 
A
ct
ua
l r
at
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g 
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ry
 
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 9 2 0 2 2 
Table M1c. DR model 1, correct forecast ratio for each rating category 
 Actual rating category 
 Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 
Obs. in category 13 22 53 114 103 172 130 44 60 9 
ML, % Δ=0 0.0 0.0 13.2 54.4 0.0 56.4 28.5 0.0 23.3 0.0 
Interval, %  0.0 0.0 15.1 28.9 39.8 44.8 31.5 15.9 30.0 0.0 
ML, % |Δ|≤1 0.0 59.1 71.7 64.9 82.5 70.9 88.5 70.5 23.3 0.0 
Interval, %  0.0 63.6 58.5 84.2 79.6 72.1 76.9 75.0 35.0 0.0 
 
 Actual rating category 
 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 total 
Obs. in category 20 67 32 54 51 16 960 
ML, % Δ=0 0.0 71.6 0.0 31.5 49.0 12.5 32.2 
Interval, %  5.0 50.7 18.8 37.0 31.4 12.5 31.7 
ML, % |Δ|≤1 71.6 71.6 50.0 63.0 62.7 25.0 66.9 
Interval, %  73.1 73.1 59.4 74.1 64.7 25.0 68.8 
 
 
Table M1d. DR model 1, correct forecast ratio for each rating class 
  Actual rating class  
  Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B total 
Obs. in class 13 189 405 113 119 121 960 
ML, % Δ=0 0.0 70.9 72.6 13.3 60.5 62.0 61.5 
Interval, %  0.0 52.4 76.5 29.2 63.9 57.0 61.1 
ML, % |Δ|≤1 100.0 99.5 95.8 96.5 89.9 97.5 96.1 
Interval, %  76.9 98.9 97.0 96.5 95.8 93.4 96.5 
 
Table M3a. BFSR model 3, ML forecast 
  Forecasted rating category 
  A A– B+ B B– C+ C C– D+ D D– E+ E 
A 0 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A– 0 10 4 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B+ 0 2 3 26 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B 0 0 5 56 0 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B– 0 0 0 37 0 34 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 
C+ 0 0 0 15 0 77 21 12 0 0 0 0 0 
C 0 0 0 4 0 43 49 27 6 0 1 0 0 
C– 0 0 0 6 0 11 29 40 20 1 0 2 0 
D+ 0 0 0 2 0 8 4 14 43 17 4 3 0 
D 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 18 32 11 6 0 
D– 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 17 14 24 0 
E+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 11 98 0 
A
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E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 
 
Table M3b. BFSR model 3, Interval forecast 
  Forecasted rating category 
  A A– B+ B B– C+ C C– D+ D D– E+ E 
A 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A– 0 6 9 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B+ 0 0 8 20 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B 0 0 7 40 29 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B– 0 0 2 19 26 24 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 
C+ 0 0 0 13 8 72 21 11 0 0 0 0 0 
C 0 0 0 3 4 41 49 26 6 0 1 0 0 
C– 0 0 0 4 3 11 31 37 20 1 0 2 0 
D+ 0 0 0 2 0 8 5 13 37 23 5 2 0 
D 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 11 40 15 1 0 
D– 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 22 22 15 0 
E+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 23 86 0 
A
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E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
 
 
Table M3c. BFSR model 3, correct forecast ratio for each rating category 
  Actual rating category  
  A A– B+ B B– C+ C C– D+ D D– E+ E total 
Obs. in category  7 22 34 99 77 125 130 109 95 71 66 122 3 960 
ML, % Δ=0 0 45 9 57 0 62 38 37 45 45 21 80 0 44.0 
Interval, %  0 27 24 40 34 58 38 34 39 56 33 70 0 44.1 
ML, % |Δ|≤1 29 64 91 62 92 78 92 82 78 86 83 89 33 81.8 
Interval, %  0 68 82 77 90 81 89 81 77 93 89 89 0 83.3 
 
 
Table M3d. BFSR model 3, correct forecast ratio for each rating class 
  Actual rating class  
  A B C D E total 
Obs. in class  29 210 364 232 125 960 
ML, % Δ=0 41.4 60.5 84.9 72.0 79.2 74.4 
Interval, %  20.7 73.8 82.1 78.4 68.8 75.8 
ML, % |Δ|≤1 100.0 100.0 99.5 99.1 100.0 99.6 
Interval, %  100.0 100.0 99.5 99.1 100.0 99.6 
 
 
